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Abstract – This paper makes a simple presentation of 
strategy games emphasizing their application to 
management in general. The language used is very 
straightforward and mathematical symbols are avoided. 
Mathematical reasoning is presented descriptively. The 
dominant perspective is critical in that game theory has 
promised so much but to a certain extent has failed to 
fulfill its promises, mainly in real world practice. 
However, recent developments envisage a brighter 
future for game theory in both from a practical and 
theoretical aspect. 
Keywords – Game theory, Cooperation, Minimax theorem, 
Zero-sum games. 
1. Introduction 
Defined in their broadest generality, the games can 
abundantly be found in real life situations. 
International politics, the economy, family life, 
election campaigns and many other situations are 
cases in which a player seeks a strategy that results so 
as to obtain a certain goal in opposition to other 
players who are also trying to optimize their 
perspective. The final result depends on the set of 
strategies adopted by all participants. 
We may say that a game is a situation in which two 
or more participants, the players, confront each other 
in order to achieve certain goals which sometimes 
may not be achieved simultaneously. Thus, a game is 
a description of strategies that include restrictions on 
the actions that players can take and on the players’ 
interests in not specifying what actions the players 
should take. In a game each player’s interests are 
confronted, forcing each one to develop action 
strategies to maximize gains or minimize losses. 
As games are disputed between competitors where 
the result of the decisions of a player’s decision 
depends on the actions of other players, apart from 
knowledge of the dispute, it is important to knowing 
the competitor. That is, to know how competitors 
may choose their strategies, their action strategy, 
what their interests are, what their objectives are. It is 
important to have information not only for the player 
himself, but mainly regarding the information held by 
the competitor. 
Game theory is a discipline that seeks to understand 
phenomena that are observed when interacting 
decisions are taken. The basic premise of this theory 
is the rationality of decisions, i.e. it starts from the 
principle that decision makers are rational and act 
strategically, taking into account their knowledge or 
expectations about the behaviour of other decision 
makers. 
Despite the fact that theoretical ideas of the game are 
not entirely mathematical, game theory uses 
mathematics to express its ideas formally because it 
is thus easier to define concepts rigorously, creating 
independence of mathematical interests, checking the 
consistency of ideas and exploring the implications of 
the results. Consequently, the concepts and results are 
accurate, interposed with motivations and 
interpretations of concepts. 
2. Minimax Theorem 
In 1985 the Babylonian Talmud – a compilation of 
ancient laws and traditions which formed the basis 
for the Jewish religion and civil and criminal law for 
the first five centuries BCE was recognized as having 
anticipated modern game theory. Nevertheless, it was 
in the 1940s that it emerged with most work directed 
at a special class of games: zero-sum games. These 
are games in which each player gets exactly what the 
other loses, regardless of the possible strategy.  
Von Neumann presented one of the greatest results 
for the constant-sum games – games where sum of 
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necessarily zero) and can always be reduced to zero-
sum games. He showed rigorously that there is 
always a rational course of action in two-player 
games, as long as their interests are completely 
opposed. Von Neumann singularly and unequivocally 
answered the question, “how can I maximize my 
payoffs in zero-sum games with two players?”. 
2.1  SUMUS versus SUNEC 
To illustrate this result consider a duopoly example 
based on R. A. McCain of two companies that sell 
bottled juices. To facilitate the study let us call these 
companies SUMUS and SUNEC. Each company has 
a fixed cost of 5,000 monetary units (m. u.) 
regardless of the number of bottles sold. Both 
companies compete for the same market and have to 
choose between selling each bottle for the price of 1 
or 2 m u. The assumptions of the problem are as 
follows:   
 for the price of 2 m. u. per bottle, 5 000 
bottles can be sold with a return of 10 000 m. u.; 
 for the price of 1 m. u.  per bottle, 10 000 
bottles can be sold with a return of 10 000 m. u.;  
 if both companies place the bottles on the 
market for the same price, sales will be equally 
divided; 
 if one company places the higher price, the 
company with the lower price sells the entire 
amount, whereas the company which places the 
higher price does not sell anything; 
 the payoffs are the profits after deducting 
fixed costs. 
Of course, when making decisions, companies have 
diametrically opposed interests. What is good for 
SUMUS is bad for SUNEC and vice versa. Clearly, it 
follows that both companies will take decisions that 
may be classified as risk-averse, i.e., decisions that 
renounce some possible gains to avoid incurring 
unnecessary losses. 
To get an overview of the situation, consider the 





1 m .u. 2 m. u. 
SUMUS 
1 m. u. (0,0) (5 000,-5 000)
2 m. u. (-5 000, 5 000) (0,0) 
Figure 2.1. The “SUMUS versus SUNEC” game - normal form 
Interpretation of the payoff matrix is as follows: the 
rows of the matrix represent the SUMUS’s options 
and the columns represent SUNEC’s options. Each 
ordered pair represents the earnings of each company 
depending on the chosen strategies. The value on the 
left is the gain for SUMUS, and the one on the right 
is the gain for SUNEC. Because it is a zero-sum 
game, SUMUS’s earnings are symmetrical with 
regards to SUNEC’s. 
Let us begin by analysing the result from SUMUS’s 
point of view, assuming that despite being able to 
reasonably predict the payoff matrix, neither 
company knows the strategy their competitor will 
adopt. Unaware of SUNEC’s plans, SUMUS may 
proceed as follows: 
 Determine the lowest payoff they can 
receive in each of their strategies – the minimum 
of each row of the payoff matrix;  
 Choose the strategy that has the highest 
minimum - choose the line of the payoff matrix. 
By doing so, SUMUS can ensure that, whatever its 
competitor’s decision, they will not get the worst 
possible outcome, avoiding the less favourable results 
(lower minimum lines). Likewise, the company will 
also never achieve the best possible outcome as they 
ignored the best results on purpose. Applying this 
procedure to Figure 2.1, SUMUS obtains: 
 
 SUNEC 
1 m. u. 2 m. u. 
SUM 
1 m. u. 0 5 000 min: 0 
maximin: 0 
2 m. u. -5 000 0 min: -5 000 
Figure 2.2. The “SUMUS versus SUNEC ” game - Maxmin strategy 
Examining the game’s results from SUNEC’s point 
of view, adopting the same criteria, the company will 
seek to maximize the set of minimums in the columns 
of their payoff matrix, obtaining:




1 m u 2 m u 
SUMUS 
1 m u 0 -5 000 
2 m u 5 000 0 
 min: 0 min: -5 000 
maximin: 0 
Figure 2.3. The “SUMUS versus SUNEC ” game - Maxmin strategy 
 
Meanwhile, given the concept of zero-sum game, the 
choice of the maximum of the minimums of the 
columns of the payoff matrix, SUNEC must generate 
the same strategy which gives the minimum of the 
maximum in the columns of SUMUS’s payoff 




1 m. u. 2 m. u. 
SUMUS 
1 m. u. 0 5 000 
2 m. u. -5 000 0 
  max: 0 max: 5 000 
minimax: 0 
Figure 2.4. The “SUMUS versus SUNEC ” game - Minimax strategy 
 
It follows that if SUNEC tries to determine the 
minimum set of maximums – minimax – from 
SUMUS’s payoff matrix, they will select the same 
strategy when trying to find the maximum of the 
minimums – maximin – from the respective payoff 
matrix. Such strategies, in which the maximum of the 
minimums of the lines is equal to the minimum of the 
maximums of the columns is called the equilibrium 
point or saddle point of the game, because by 
choosing these strategies, both companies assure 
themselves a minimum gain regardless of what the 
opponent does. Thus, no company will feel motivated 
to leave its equilibrium strategy unilaterally. 
Furthermore, no company will have cause to regret 
their decision as soon as they know their opponent’s 
choice, because they both know that, given the 
opposing company’s choice they would do worse if 
they took another decision. In other words, the 
equilibrium solution is stable in the sense that each 
company may announce its choice before the 
opponent, assured that the opponent cannot use such 
information to achieve a higher gain. 
2.2 Rock-Paper-Scissors 
All of the strategies considered in the previous game 
were completely deterministic. That is, strategies that 
establish everything a player should know. Any 
strategy that is completely deterministic is called 
pure strategy. An equilibrium where both players 
use a pure strategy is an equilibrium in pure 
strategies. However, there are situations in which the 
equilibrium considers that players use strategies that 
are not completely deterministic. Any strategy that is 
not completely deterministic said to be mixed 
strategy. An equilibrium in which at least one player 
operates a mixed strategy is said to be an 
equilibrium in mixed strategies. When players use 
mixed strategies, they act randomly. The advantage 
of using mixed strategies is to include uncertainty in 
the opponent; that is, when player play with mixed 
strategies they are no longer predictable. Although 
the goal of a mixed strategy is to keep the opponent 
in the dark through unpredictability, it does not imply 
at all a totally random pattern of moves. In a situation 
where players use mixed strategies, each of them may 
choose a strategy randomly in each round. Thus, the 
opponent cannot predict which strategy the player 
will adopt. Each player’s problem will then be to 
adjust these probabilities optimally. 
Mathematically a mixed strategy is a probability 
distribution over pure strategies. It is through this 
concept that a game which does not have equilibrium 
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points in pure strategies can be solved, because if any 
exist they are the game’s solution. 
To illustrate this, consider the ROCK-PAPER-
SCISSORS game. This two-player game, Maximum 
and Minimum, is played as follows: each player 
simultaneously makes a gesture representing each of 
the three objects (rock, paper, scissors). If both 
players choose the same object, they neither win nor 
lose; otherwise, victory is achieved according to the 
following rules: scissors cut paper, paper wraps 
stone, stone breaks scissors. The payoff is +1 for a 
win and -1 for a loss. Figure 2.5 represents the 
normal form of this classic two-player game: 
 
 Minimum 
Maximum Scissors Paper Rock 
Scissors  0,0   1,1   1,1  
Paper  1,1   0,0   1,1  
Rock  1,1   1,1   0,0  
Figure 2.5. The “Rock‐paper‐scissors” game –normal 
representation 
Each player has three pure strategies, Scissors (T) or 
Paper (P) or Rock (D). Let us take (T,T). Minimum 
has an incentive to play Rock (D) and, thus, turn a 
defeat into a victory. The same occurs in each of the 
nine combinations of pure strategies, where none of 
the combinations of pure strategies is an equilibrium 
point. The “scissors-paper-rock” game cannot be 
solved using pure strategies. This game’s solution 
necessarily involves mixed strategies.  
Let us consider p1 the probability that Maximum 
choose scissors, p2 the probability of choosing paper 
and p3, the probability of choosing rock. Similarly, 
let us suppose q1 is the probability of Minimum 
choosing scissors, q2, the probability of choosing 
paper and q3, the probability of choosing rock. Now 
let us consider Maximum’s payoffs. Assuming 
Maximum uses pure strategy Scissors and Minimum 
uses a mixed strategy q=(q1,q2,q3). As Minimum 
uses a mixed strategy, Maximum anticipates an 
expected payoff 
E(T,q)=q1x0+q2x1+q3x(-1). 
When Minimum chooses Paper Maximum wins; 
when chooses Minimum Rock, Maximum loses, and 
when Minimum chooses Scissors neither player wins. 
Let us suppose now that Maximum chooses the pure 
strategy Paper. As Minimum plays a mixed strategy, 
Maximum anticipates an expected payoff 
E(P,q)=q1x(-1)+q2x0+q3x1. 
When Minimum chooses Scissors, Maximum loses; 
when Minimum chooses Rock, Maximum wins, and 
when Minimum chooses paper the players tie. Let us 
suppose now that Maximum chooses the pure 
strategy Rock. As Minimum uses a mixed strategy, 
Maximum anticipates an expected payoff 
E(D,q)=q1x1+q2x(-1)+q3x0. 
When Minimum chooses Paper, Maximum loses; 
when Minimum chooses Scissors, Maximum wins, 
and when Minimum chooses Rock, the players tie 
From balancing the various expected payoffs number, 
we get 
E(T,q)= E(P,q)= E(D,q) that is q1x0+q2x1+q3x(-1)= 
q1x(-1)+q2x0+q3x1= q1x1+q2x(-1)+q3x0 
Because mixed strategy is a probability we have 
q1+q2+q3=1.  Solving the system consisting of these 
equations we obtain q*1=q*2=q*3=⅓, the value for 
the Minimum mixed strategy equilibrium. Given the 
symmetry of the game, the same strategy is an 
equilibrium for Maximum. In equilibrium each player 
obtains an expected value of ⅓. 
With a simple calculation it is easy to check that if 
one player maintains equal probabilities for their 
strategy and the other player changes his set of 
probabilities, the latter cannot improve his payoff 
average. We conclude that the strategy of combining 
equal probability is an equilibrium point for the 
game. In this situation both players can inform their 
opponent their chosen strategy without incurring any 
harm. 
 
If a game has a saddle point, the players should not 
deviate from the strategies that lead to this 
equilibrium as the pair of strategies such that each 
player maximizes their respective minimum is the 
game’s solution. When there is no saddle point, being 
rational players, considering the use of mixed 
strategies we can use the same criteria to ensure a set 
of probabilities for each player leading to the same 
average result, which will be the best payoff each 
player could get. 
This powerful result that von Neumann demonstrated 
is known as: 
Minimax Theorem: Any two-player zero-sum game 
has a mixed strategy for each player, such that the 
expected gain for both has the same value when 
players use these strategies. This value is the best 
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gain each player can expect to get, so that such mixed 
strategies are the optimal strategies for the players. 
Thus, for two people in a zero-sum game it is rational 
for each player to choose the strategy that maximizes 
the minimum payoff, and the pair of strategies and 
payoffs such that each player maximizes the 
minimum. This is the respective game’s solution. 
Despite attempts by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
to “extend” this powerful result, that von Neumann 
demonstrated, to non-constant-sum games with 
multiple participants, it is only valid for zero-sum 
games for two players. The greatest difficulty for 
non-constant sum games with multiple participants 
led to the fact that of the various solutions presented, 
none had been accepted mathematically as a solution 
for non-constant sum games. 
3. Nash Theorem  
The Minimax theorem says what the “rational” 
solution for two-player zero-sum games is, but it is 
no solution for games where there is no saddle point. 
In such cases there will not be a strategy for any of 
the players that cannot be exploited by an opponent 
who obtains advance knowledge of what he wishes to 
do. However, since there is always the possibility of 
the adversary receiving information about our 
intentions, how should a rational player proceed 
under such circumstances? This is the central 
question supporting all of the mathematical theory of 
games.  
Let us consider another example of price competition 
based on W. Nutter. Two companies, VILEC and 
HIPEREL sell “parts” for the price of 1 m u, 2 m u 
and 3 m u for “parts”". It is assumed that:       
 the payoffs are the profits, after all fixed 
costs are subtracted;  
 the company practising lower prices have 
more customers; 
 the company practising lower will prices 
obtain more profits, with limits, than the company 
practising the highest price. 
The following figure represents the payoff matrix 





1 m. u. 2 m. u. 3 m. u. 
 
HIPEREL 
1 m. u. 0; 0 50; -10 40; -20 
2 m. u. -10; 50 20; 20 90; 10 
3 m. u. -20; 40 10; 90 50; 50 
 
Figure 3.1. The “VILEC versus HIPEREL” game –normal representation 
 
From the figure we can see this game is not a zero-
sum game. Profits may be 100 m u, 40 m u, 20 m u or 
0 m. u., depending on the strategy chosen by each 
company. For this reason the maximin theorem does 
not apply. 
Analyzing the payoff matrix from the point of view 
of the HIPEREL company, they can act as follows: if 
VILEC chooses a price of 3 m. u., the best price 
HIPERELEC is 2 m u but at this price for HIPEREL, 
1 m u will be the best price for VILEC. 
Examining the strategy regarding the choice of price 
of 3 m u for each company, it appears that each can 
benefit from reducing their price as long as the 
competitor sticks to their strategy. 
Now considering the strategy corresponding to the 
price of 3 m um for HIPEREL and 2 m u for VILEC, 
similar reasoning to that above can be made; VILEC 
can benefit from reducing its price to 1 m u. 
Following this analysis all strategies are eliminated, 
except the pair in which both companies set the price 
at 1 m u, i.e., the pair of strategies corresponding to 
the lowest price is such that neither company can 
improve its payoff through a unilateral change of its 
strategy.  
This example is based on a generalization of the 
Minimax theorem for the case of non-zero-sum 
games involving two or more players in direct 
competition – non-cooperative games. John Nash 
showed the theorem that generalizes the Minimax 
theorem: 
Nash Theorem: Any non-cooperative game of n 
players, in which each player has a finite number of 
pure strategies, has at least one set of equilibrium 
strategies. 
This theorem shows that there can be multiple 
equilibrium strategies adding great difficulty to what 
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we consider to be rational behaviour. On the other 
hand, despite being non-cooperative games, the 
theorem shows that players gain more if they agree to 
cooperate.  
4. Prisoner's Dilemma 
The frontier between pure and applied game theory is  
vague; some developments in pure theory were 
motivated by applications. Such is the case of the 
example that A. W. Tucker presented at a conference 
addressed to psychologists at Stanford University 
(1950) with the aim of illustrating the difficulty of 
analysing non-cooperative games. 
In these games it is not possible for players to plan 
strategies together. They are games that emphasize 
the rationality required when two individuals are in a 
position where a decision of one depends on the 
decision of the other. 
Let us consider the following example: two supposed 
criminals, Joe and Tony are imprisoned. The problem 
for the police is, assuming that both are involved and 
in the absence of evidence, the need for a confession. 
The prisoners are in individual and distant cells with 
no communication between them. Each receives an 
explanation of the rules of the case: 
   If neither of them chooses to confess both 
will be charged with a misdemeanour that 
involves a symbolic penalty of only one month in 
prison.  
 If both confess to taking part in the crime, 
then they will both be sentenced to six months in 
prison. 
 Finally, if one confesses and the other does 
not, then whoever confesses will be released 
immediately, and the other will be sentenced to 
the maximum sentence under the law: nine 
months in prison (six months for the crime plus 
three more for obstructing justice). 
The strategies in this case are: to confess or not to 
confess. The payoffs are the sentences. We can 






Does not confess Confesses  
Does not confess  1,1   0,9  
Confesses   9,0   6,6  
Figure 4.1- Prisoner's dilemma –normal representation 
The matrix reads as follows: each prisoner chooses 
one of two strategies. Joe chooses a line while Tony 
chooses a column. Both numbers in each cell express 
each prisoner’s sentence and correspond to the pair of 
strategies chosen by them.  
The number on the left corresponds to the payoff of 
the prisoner who chooses lines – Joe, while the 
number on the right corresponds to the payoff of the 
prisoner who chooses columns – Tony. Thus, reading 
the first column in descending order, if neither 
confesses, each is sentenced to a sentence of 1 month, 
but if Joe confesses and Tony does not, Joe goes free, 
while Tony is sentenced to 9 months. 
Which will be the “rational” strategies so that each of 
the criminals minimizes the time he will spend in 
prison? Two things can happen: Joe confesses or does 
not confess. Now, if Joe confesses, we have: 
 
 
Joe confesses  
Tony does not confess Tony is sentenced to 9 months in prison 
Tony confesses Tony is sentenced to 6 months in prison 
Figure 4.2‐ Prisoner's dilemma – Joe confesses 
 
If Joes does not confess, we get: 
 




Joe does not 
confess 
Tony does not confess Tony is sentenced to 1 month in prison 
Tony confesses Tony goes free 
Figure 4.3- Prisoner's dilemma – Joe does not confess 
Observing the previous two tables we find that, in 
both cases, it is better for Tony to confess. Reversing 
Joe and Tony’s roles, it will also be better for Joe to 
confess. The result of the game will be one in which 
both prisoners confess to the crime, both prisoners’ 
rationality makes them choose the strategy of 
confessing the crime. 
This is due to the fact that both criminals are facing 
dominant equilibrium strategy; regardless of the 
combinations of strategies that each of criminals 
does, the best choice is always “to confess” and thus 
called a dominant strategy. Since both players “play” 
the dominant strategy, they “fall” into the dominant 
strategy equilibrium. 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma game is a two player game 
that is based on the conflict between individual and 
collective rationality. According to individual 
rationality, the prisoner gets a higher payoff by 
denouncing the other. If both prisoners sacrifice 
themselves through silence, they get a better payoff. 
So, to ensure the best payoff, prisoners are base their 
decisions on common interests. In this game, players 
do not communicate with each other and play only 
once. Since these are changed assumptions, it is most 
likely that the outcome of the game will also change.  
5. Conclusion 
Even when Tucker thought up the Prisoners' 
Dilemma, game theory was already a recognized 
science. We can say that those responsible for this 
recognition were John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern with the publication of the book 
"Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour" (1944). 
John Nash (Nobel prize 1994), was also a pioneer in 
this science by having formalized clearly the types of 
games and their possibility for equilibrium. Later 
Nash’s results were successively extended to more 
complex cases, with crucial steps in this process 
taken by Reinhard Selten and John Harsanyi (Nobel 
prize 1994). 
Today game theory is well advanced, enabling vast 
and interesting results to be obtained in classifying, 
formalizing and solving day-to-day conflicts in all 
areas and in all situations involving strategic 
interaction. 
However, because the assumptions impose 
constraints which guide the actions of the players 
involved, and do not observe their personalities, there 
is still much to do. With no intention of discrediting 
the techniques and analyses studied, of course, its 
limitations are mentioned in order to allow the reader 
to gain a clear awareness of the limitations of the 
analytical methods studied, because without that “we 
may become their slaves rather than their masters”. 
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